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Applying Budd’s model to partnership 
 
Over the last decade, the notions of workplace partnership and labour-
management co-operation have resulted in distinctive and vociferous 
debates regarding forms of employee voice in the UK.  It is proposed that 
there is a need to reconsider how we actually evaluate both the process and 
outcomes of partnership.  Detailed case studies were conducted in three 
diverse banking organisations in order to understand more about the 
process and outcomes of partnership.  The study then applies the 
‘efficiency, equity, voice’ framework developed by Budd which has not been 
widely employed in industrial relations research.  Accordingly, the paper 
examines if and how partnership contributes to the balancing of efficiency, 
equity and voice. Judged in this light, the case studies demonstrate various 
degrees of success in terms of the extent to which partnership facilitated 
voice and promoted more considered decision making, for both 
management and employees.  The paper also demonstrates the usefulness 
of the Budd framework as a device in explaining employment relations 
processes and outcomes. 
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Applying Budd’s model to partnership 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Over the last decade, the notion of workplace partnership has resulted in 
distinctive and vociferous debates regarding employee representation in the 
UK, attracting great attention from both policymakers and researchers alike 
(Acas, 2003; DTI, 1998, IPA, 1997, TUC, 1999).  Research has focused 
upon both the potential of partnership as a union revitalisation strategy 
(Haynes and Allen, 2001; Heery, 2002; Wills, 2004), and the extent to which 
mutual gains are actually realisable (Guest and Peccei, 2001; Martinez-
Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Roche and Geary, 
2002; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004; Terry and Smith, 2003).    
 
Many of the early empirical studies revealed mixed results, with the more 
positive studies revealing a range of benefits including stronger workplace 
organisation, union legitimacy and improved consultation. (Haynes and 
Allen, 2001; Wills, 2004).  Critical studies, on the other hand, suggested 
work intensification, job insecurity and limited union effectiveness (Kelly, 
2004, Tailby et.al, 2004). More recent research reveals how partnership 
depends upon various contextual factors including underlying management 
and union strategies, rationale for partnership, and the way in which it has 
been implemented (Heery, 2002; Heery et.al, 2004; Roche and Geary 2002; 
Samuel, 2007; Wills, 2004). Different types of partnership have also been 
identified including formal/ informal, union/non-union, private/public sector 
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arrangements, and typologies of partnerships have been developed (Kelly, 
2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Wray, 2004).   
 
While a steady stream of partnership studies has continued to emerge over 
the last five years (e.g. Danford et.al, 2008; Jenkins, 2007, 2008; Samuel, 
2007), several significant issues of interest remain.  Firstly, there is a need 
to be clear about the meaning and purpose of partnership arrangements.  In 
evaluating the ‘outcomes’ or ‘gains’, we must reconsider what partnership 
actually means, and what such arrangements are expected to achieve. 
There is also a need to understand more about partnership as a process, 
and what it means in terms of relationships and decision making between 
actors.    A further issue of interest concerns the dynamics of the different 
‘types’ of partnership arrangements which exist.  Addressing these issues is 
the purpose of this article. 
 
Meaning of partnership 
 The meaning of partnership remains a matter for debate (Ackers et.al, 
2004; Ackers and Payne, 1998; Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Stuart 
and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).  Academic definitions have focused upon 
identifying the principles, practices, processes, values and outcomes 
associated with partnership working (Marchington, 1998; Guest and Peccei, 
1998, 2001).  Dietz suggests a useful definition “should describe a set of 
organisational characteristics and practices that, firstly, do justice to the idea 
of managing employment relations in a ‘partnership’ manner and secondly, 
are readily observable in order to verify a genuine example in practice” 
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(Dietz, 2004, 4; see also Guest and Peccei, 2001).  More practical 
definitions are offered by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Involvement 
and Participation Association (IPA) centred around partnership ‘building 
blocks’ such as organisational success, mutual legitimacy, consultation, and 
balancing employment security and flexibility (IPA, 1998, TUC, 1999). 
However, both include outcomes as part of their definition of partnership, 
and it is proposed here that it is important not to conflate partnership 
processes with employment relations outcomes.  Employment relations 
outcomes (such as employment security or adding value) are better thought 
of as aspirations which can be explored empirically, but do not constitute an 
integral component of the partnership process per se.  Partnership may 
concern an attempt to achieve these outcomes, irrespective of whether or 
not they are achieved.  
 
 It is proposed that a more useful definition would identify the practices and 
processes associated with partnership. In terms of practices, employee 
voice is central to all definitions and this may involve a mix of direct 
participation, representative participation and financial involvement (Guest 
and Peccei, 2001). However, most policy and organisational definitions 
associate partnership with representative participation (IPA, 1998, TUC, 
1999), normally (but not always) involving trade unions. This is also implicit 
in most academic research (Tailby and Winchester, 2005). The process of 
partnership concerns issues including decision making and actor 
relationships. Partnership decision making is typically described as a ‘joint 
problem solving approach’ (Dietz, 2004; Haynes and Allen, 2001), 
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characterised by a genuine process of early consultation and affording some 
influence over decision making. This does  not necessarily mean joint 
decision making (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Terry, 2003). Actor 
relationships are said to require trust, openness, mutual legitimacy and a 
commitment to business success, and as such the values and behaviour of 
organisational actors are crucial (Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; 
Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005)i. Inevitably, there is likely to be some 
variety within this general framework, but it is suggested that these are the 
practices and processes which underpin a prima facie case of partnership 
and are likely to be mutually reinforcing.   
 
Processes and outcomes  
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the literature is the focus on raw 
quantitative outcomes, and the tendency to overlook the more subtle 
processes and qualitative outcomes of partnership. This is odd not least 
because partnership outcomes are notoriously difficult to quantify (Roper, 
2000), but especially because partnership is about much more than just 
examining quantitative labour/business outcomes. Rather, partnership can 
be viewed more broadly as an attempt to reconfigure employment relations 
in light of the demise of old style joint regulation (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 
2004; Terry, 2003). The narrow focus on measuring outcomes is also 
criticised by Dietz, who suggests that it not just the outcome which is 
important but also more subtle issues such as the way issues have been 
handled.  For example in relation to job losses: 
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“One need not express surprise when large scale redundancies 
take place under partnership. The issue is how they are agreed 
upon and handled.  Training to enhance staff employability also 
plays a part” (Dietz, 2004, 9) 
 
Thus partnership is also about subtle changes in attitudes and behaviours, 
which may not always be apparent if a narrow outcome focus is taken, 
requiring more attention to “internal behaviour transformations and 
attitudinal improvements” (Dietz, 2004, 7; c.f. Walton and McKersie, 1965). 
Such factors would inevitably be missed by studies such as Kelly (2004) 
where selected labour outcomes such as pay levels or job losses are used 
to ‘measure’ the success of partnership. More attention needs to be paid to 
both the process-oriented dynamics of partnership, and in particular the 
nature of more intangible qualitative outcomes, such as the overall quality of 
actor relationships and the climate of employment relations.   
 
There are also issues with the way the outcomes of partnership have been 
evaluated and judged, as well as a lack of agreement regarding what 
partnership is expected to achieve, and the measurements for success. 
Consequently, outcomes are too easily offset against unrealistic 
announcements and agreements (e.g. increasing transparency, enhancing 
training and development, creating a better quality of working life), or other 
equally ambitious aims such as the renaissance of the union movement, 
exceeding the expectations of even optimists like Ackers and Payne (1998).  
In addition, few UK studies have considered the implications of partnership 
from the perspective of managers; research has focused somewhat 
narrowly on the labour outcomes.  A notable exception is the work of Guest 
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and Peccei (2001), who examined the ‘balance of advantage’.  Interestingly, 
their results, which conclude that the balance of advantage may be slightly 
tipped in favour of management, has often been selectively quoted by other 
researchers as evidence of the ‘failure’ of partnership.  This is despite the 
overall conclusions of Guest and Peccei that, in certain circumstances, 
“partnership can lead to potential benefits for all the partners (2001, 233).  
 
Again, much depends on how ‘successful’ partnership is defined, and what it 
is expected to achieve, but it seems unrealistic to expect that that long-term 
partnerships will lead to harmonious, consensual and conflict-free IR (Terry 
and Smith, 2003).  It also seems unrealistic to even suggest that partnership 
will lead to ‘mutual gains’ in the purest sense of the term, with gains flowing 
equally and harmoniously to all parties; indeed it is difficult to imagine what 
such a situation would look like.  Finally, studies need to be sensitive to the 
different types of arrangements which exist under the partnership umbrella, 
and distinctions can be made in terms of various factors including union 
recognition, formality, and rationale for the agreement (Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005).  
 
 
ACHIEVING EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND VOICE? 
 
In order to move beyond the current impasse in the British partnership 
debate, and reconsider how we actually evaluate the process and outcomes 
of partnership, a  useful normative framework is provided by Budd (Budd, 
2004).   
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
He suggests that we should return to considerations regarding the 
fundamental objectives of the employment relationship. Building upon the 
traditional economic view of the employment relationship, in which business 
wants to increase profits and workers want higher wages, he argues that 
equity and voice are equally important objectives.  The narrow economic 
focus, he suggests, must be balanced with employees entitlement to fair 
treatment (equity) and the opportunity to have meaningful input into 
decisions (voice).  He argues that extreme positions of either dimension are 
both undesirable and untenable and that the aim is to strike a balance 
between efficiency, equity and voice (see Figure 1).   
 
Writing from an American IR perspective, Budd (2004) opens up an old 
British IR debate about political process and economic outcomes. Thus the 
Webb's Industrial Democracy (1897) stressed the instrumental, economic 
role of trade unions and collective bargaining as a means of controlling 
excessive labour market competition and securing good wages and 
conditions. Industrial relations pluralists, such as Clegg (1960) and Flanders 
(1975) responded by emphasising instead the political benefits of 'joint 
regulation'. Later radicals, notably Fox (1974) and Hyman (1975), in their 
critique of pluralism, returned to the Webbs' largely economic criteria. In 
their view, at that time, stable joint regulation did not deliver enough benefits 
to workers in terms of wages and conditions. The paradox here is that both 
neo-classical economists and Marxists tend to stress quantitative outcomes, 
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while pluralists wish to emphasise the qualitative process - while supporting 
equitable wage comparisons and the efficient use of labour and ordered 
wage setting as a basis for national economic growth.  
 
Budd's work is a response to the dominant emphasis of US HRM on narrow 
business performance or 'efficiency. However, Hyman (2005) criticises him 
for endowing the employment relationship with goals, rather than 
concentrating on the largely economic implications for employees. In our 
view, the value of Budd's framework is that it explicitly sets out the three 
dimension that have run through this long IR debate. First, efficiency matters 
because it creates stable employment at the company level and growth at 
national level, for the benefit of shareholders, employees and society. 
Second, equity matters because employees and society care about the 
distribution of benefits. Third, voice matters because in a democratic society 
employees should have some say over how  decisions are made.  
 
Budd’s call for ‘balance’ has probably caused most controversy, as it could 
be perceived as suggesting the achievement of some kind of stable 
equilibrium, and raises concerns as to whether this is actually achievable 
(Adams, 2005; Estreicher, 2005).  Adams (2005, 115) proposes a slightly 
modified objective, “optimality within minimally accepted bounds…societies 
should attempt to optimise efficiency, equity and voice – but the result might 
not be an equal weighting of all three objectives”.  In other words, the aim 
should be to achieve sufficient levels of voice and equity compatible with 
high levels of efficiency.  Budd (2005) acknowledges such criticisms, and 
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suggests that ‘balance’ need not necessarily be thought of as an equal 
weighting between the three dimensions, but rather as “the search for 
arrangements that enhance one or more dimensions without undue 
sacrifices in other dimensions” (p.196).  He suggests that they can usefully 
be viewed more as a ‘regulative ideal’ even if they are never realised or 
cannot be easily measured.  As Clegg (1975) argued, it is impossible to talk 
of an equal balance of power between 'labour' and 'capital', just as it 
pointless to try and neatly fix the exact balance efficiency, equity and voice. 
The point is that IR in a socially regulated, liberal democratic, capitalist 
society should modify the goal of efficiency by equity and voice. 
   
The Budd framework has not yet been used in employment relations 
research, while Budd also suggests that efficiency, equity and voice “provide 
the dimensions for evaluating social partnerships” (Budd, 2004, 120), and 
therefore this study offers an ideal opportunity to test of the utility of the 
framework, and to examine partnership under a different analytical lens.  
Accordingly, this paper examines if and how partnership may contribute to 
the balancing of efficiency, equity and voice.   
 
 
 
METHODS AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Case studies were conducted in three banking organisations, referred to by 
the pseudonyms ‘NatBank’, ‘BuSoc’ and ‘WebBank’.  Conducting case 
studies allowed rich contextual data to be obtained, and focusing on one 
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sector means many variables are similar, for example product and labour 
markets and the general competitive environment.  By focusing upon one 
area of banking firms, namely administration centres and call centres, the 
labour process and employee profiles of each organisation are also similar. 
Following the ‘firm-in-sector’ method, it is suggested that it is useful to place 
organisational developments within the wider context in which they operate 
(Smith et.al, 1990).  
 
In order to establish whether the companies qualified as prima facie 
partnership organisations, following preliminary discussions with key 
employment relations actors, a detailed analysis of policy documents was 
undertaken and these were compared with the policy definitions offered by 
the TUC and IPA.  The NatBank and WebBank structures were explicitly 
modelled upon the TUC and IPA definitions respectively, and clear 
similarities could be seen between employment relations policy documents 
and these definitions.  While at BuSoc there was no written partnership 
document, analysis of other internal policy documents confirmed explicit 
commitments to most of the principles normally associated with partnership 
arrangements.  These included commitments to business success, 
consultation, legitimacy of representation, information sharing, and efforts to 
balance flexibility and employment security(see Table 1) 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 The specific partnership infrastructure in each case, however, varied across 
several dimensions including route to partnership, corporate governance, 
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union recognition, and formality (see Table 1).  In particular, the cases 
represent prima facie cases of partnership with an external union, 
partnership with an internal (staff) union, and partnership with an in-house 
non-union representative body.  The financial service sector also represents 
a key component of the UK private sector and of the economy as a whole, 
and this is underlined by recent global economic events.   Financial services 
also provides a point of contrast to much industrial relations research which 
remains firmly rooted in traditional manufacturing and public sector contexts.  
It is also distinctive in the private service sector in that there is a long 
tradition of various forms of  both union and non-union employee 
representation (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2008).  
 
 It is also a sector which has experienced massive change from stable 
oligopolistic ‘traditional banking’ in the post-war era to a turbulent and highly 
competitive global ‘new banking’.  This has led to organisational attempts in 
the 1990s to change organisational culture, pay, staffing and work 
organisation.  In the same period relationships between employers and 
unions became increasingly adversarial with a significant rise in disputes 
and calls for industrial action in what was previously regarded to be a very 
stable, paternalistic component of the economy in employment relations 
terms (Storey et.al,1997,  2000).  The numerous partnership agreements in 
the sector have also been found to have been relatively enduring (Bacon 
and Samuel, 2009).  This context provides an excellent leading edge test of 
partnership i.e. to what extent can partnership regulate the competing equity 
and efficiency forces, in an industry where such forces had generally been 
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balanced in the post war era?  A summary of the main characteristics of 
each organisation is provided in Table 1 (below). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Given the particular aims of this study to understand more about the 
processes of partnership such as the more subtle systems of decision 
making, a qualitative approach was deemed essential.  The bulk of the data 
was obtained through interviews.  A total of 50 interviews were conducted, 
consisting of a range of managers, union/employee representatives, and 
employee focus groups from each organisation in the period 2004/5.  These 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  A danger with research into 
experiences of partnership is that the researcher may expect to find three 
basic attitudes (positive, negative, agnostic), and such attitudes may be 
clouded by recent events, such as a recent pay rise or announcement of job 
losses.  In other words, respondents supposed attitudes to partnership may 
just reflect the extent to which there is a ‘feel good factor’ within the 
organisation at the time. 
 
Inspired by ‘critical incident technique’ (CIT) a particular aim of the 
interviews was to “capture the thought processes, the frame of reference, 
and the feelings about an incident...which have meaning for the respondent” 
(Chell, 1999, 56). This mitigates the risks of obtaining data which reflects 
vague underlying feeling regarding recent organisational events, as opposed 
 14 
to attitudes to partnership per se.  CIT interviews, on the other hand, involve 
the discussion of significant occurrences (incidents, events) identified by the 
respondent, the way they were managed and the perceived outcomes and 
effects.  In practice, this method required interviewees to identify some of 
the main organisational issues/incidents which have been prominent in the 
last five years (or since they joined the organisation if less than five years).  
This allowed context-rich examples which  illustrated the ‘lived realities’ of 
the partnership process to be obtained.  This was supplemented by a 
detailed review of documentation including annual reports, media reports, 
company magazines, and various internal reports, presentations, meeting 
minutes and memos.  
 
 
THREE CASES OF PARTNERSHIP 
 
This section outlines the empirical evidence from the three case studies, by 
exploring in detail actor perceptions of important decisions in each 
organisation. 
 
 
 
NatBank: union partnership as a ‘solution’  
NatBank is one of the ‘Big Four’ British banks.  The organisation signed a 
formal partnership agreement with its recognised trade union following an 
extended period of fractious industrial relations throughout the 1990s.  The 
partnership agreement was based upon an adaptation of the six principles of 
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partnership espoused by the TUC. There was an extensive partnership 
machinery at both a national and local level, consisting of senior and middle 
managers, local union representatives and national union officials.  Much of 
the emphasis was upon encouraging local dialogue and decision making, 
especially around discipline and grievance and issues of organisational 
change.  Negotiations around pay and conditions, however, still occurred 
primarily at a national level. 
 
 As a large city institution, senior management made clear that efficiency 
was the primary objective, and that ultimately the business was owned by 
shareholders expecting a return on their investment.  Indeed, during the 
1990s industrial relations unrest was compounded by a loss of City 
confidence in the organisation and intense global competition.  However, 
since the partnership agreement in 2000, there was evidence to suggest 
that the business efficiency objectives were, to some extent, being regulated 
by the partnership mechanism.  For example, like many organisations in the 
late 1990s, the bank began outsourcing to India to save costs and increase 
efficiency.  However, it was suggested that with the partnership arrangement 
the offshoring process was more equitable than it could have been.  
 
 Since partnership an agreed union-management consultative framework 
has been devised. Known as a ‘Globalisation Agreement’, the document 
explicitly outlines both employer and union commitments regarding a fair 
and transparent process for the management of offshoring.  The union 
described it as representing a number of “hoops the organisation has to 
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jump through”.  Specific commitments included policies regarding the 
avoidance of compulsory redundancies, voluntary redundancy packages, 
redeployment, retraining, career support and extensive notice periods.  The 
union National Officer suggested that although the agreement does not stop 
efficiency-driven offshoring policies, it does ensure that NatBank engage in 
early union consultation, and prevents management from making only 
minimal or cursory attempts to consult staff (voice), by committing them to a 
process which far exceeds statutory minimum requirements (equity).  This 
contrasts with the period prior to partnership, where a previous restructuring 
exercise was said by representatives to have been “presented as a fait 
accompli completely out of the blue”, with employees reporting “a major hoo-
haa” with “everyone extremely worried”.  
 
NatBank management also proposed that all call centre staff should be 
encouraged to sell on calls, taking the efficiency view that call centres 
should be proactively generating new leads and additional revenue, rather 
than reactively servicing the customer.  Prior to the relocation of several 
back office functions to India, many long-serving staff had little experience of 
customer facing telephone work. The additional pressure associated with a 
blanket policy for employees to try and sell on all calls (efficiency), proved to 
be too stressful for many, and ultimately resulted in high employee turnover.  
Following protracted discussions with the union (voice), management 
agreed to re-introduce a customer service-only role, even though this 
modified their initial aim to maximise efficiency by having all call agents 
trying to sell on every single call. The Employee Relations Manager 
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suggested that the corporate-level sales strategy represented a “pure 
technical model” which neglected the realities and dynamics of the call 
centre. As he explained: 
“For a long time, we resisted the union calls for splitting sales and service.  
And then lo and behold – we thought oh, wouldn’t it be good to split sales 
and service?  And the union said we told you so.  It’s a good example of 
where we’ve worked together with partnership” (Employee Relations 
Manager).    
 
Equally, union representatives cited this as an example of successful joint 
working, especially for experienced employees who found the pressure to 
sell was simply too much, but excelled as customer service advisers.  This 
illustrates how a management policy to improve efficiency was perceived to 
be deeply inequitable, and this in turn had a negative impact on efficiency as 
employee attrition rapidly increased, suggesting a business case for equity 
also exists.     
 
The efficiency and equity tensions were also evident from a business idea to 
harmonise contracts from traditional 9-5 to staggered 8am-midnight pattern.  
Again, since the offshoring of most non-customer facing roles, the 
administration centre was now a primarily a call centre, and customers 
expected to be able to contact the bank at any time of the day or night. 
However, many long-serving staff members only worked normal office 
hours, resulting in shortages of evening staff which management viewed as 
inefficient.   Acutely concerned regarding the possibility of long serving staff 
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being compelled to sign new flexible contracts, the union successfully 
persuaded the Bank through extensive dialogue (voice), to leave long-
serving staff on the old working hours should they so wish, by highlighting 
the potential damage to morale and associated industrial relations upheaval 
if this controversial change was simply imposed (equity).  
 
Management acknowledged that the negative impact of employee 
perceptions of inequity may negate or even outweigh the proposed 
administrative efficiencies of contract harmonisation.  This required 
management and the union to return to the main issue: how could they staff 
telephones in the evening to meet customer demand? It was decided that a 
compromise was to recruit a pool of new staff working flexible hours set to 
match business demand.  This was not the ideal situation for the business, 
which would prefer all employees to work on a flexible pattern (efficiency), 
and neither was it the ideal situation for the union, which would have 
preferred to avoid what it believed to represent a ‘two-tier’ system (equity).  
Nevertheless, the union took the pragmatic view that their primary 
responsibility is to defend the interests of existing fee-paying members. As 
the Employee Relations Manager reflected: 
“If we hadn’t had the ongoing dialogue with the union, there is no doubt we 
would have imposed something from on high, would have pissed a lot of 
people off, would have moved our attrition rates up, and it would have cost 
us more in the long term...We let people stay on those contracts, kept them 
happy and working, and didn’t make radical changes we didn’t need to” 
(Employee Relations Manager).   
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A union representative was also pleased a compromise had been reached 
explaining how: 
“Although it’s not ideal for us, and  it isn’t benefiting the business as much as 
they would like, it made everyone happy.  Management knew the score” 
(Union representative).    
 
Within NatBank, voice was a prominent issue.  In a workplace which had 
experienced significant organisational change, the local union 
representatives were active and enthusiastic, employees knew who their 
union representatives were, and support for the union was strong. There 
was evidence, therefore, that at NatBank the voice afforded through the 
partnership mechanism was moderating decision-making and mitigating the 
worst effects of organisational change on employees (equity). In several 
cases, the union was able to promote equity as a countervailing pressure 
against pure business decisions based on a narrow financial efficiency logic.  
There was also evidence of a business case for equity, given that decisions 
which were perceived to be inequitable, were often recognised by 
management to be ultimately counterproductive due to the negative impact 
on morale, and the increase in attrition (efficiency).  Positive assessments 
regarding the improved dialogue partnership afforded was evident among 
managers, union representatives and employees alike: 
“With partnership, the union are a great mechanism.  They make you stop 
and think.  Are we being fair?  Is it even legal? We go through this whole 
process, and by the time we make the final decision we are absolutely 
convinced it’s the right thing to do” (Call Centre Manager) 
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“We know about a lot of the issues, be it restructuring, job losses or even 
knocking down walls, a long time before it happens.  Now they run virtually 
everything past us and ask for our feedback” (Union representative). 
“The Bank don’t seem to go as far as they could with decisions sometimes.  
They do seem to have respect for their employees” (Customer Adviser).     
 
BuSoc: union partnership as an ‘evolution’ 
The triad can also be used to evaluate partnership  at BuSoc.  Though there 
was no written union-management partnership agreement in this case, a 
history of co-operative employment relations, and joint commitments to 
business success, employment security, union legitimacy, and information 
and consultation, reflected the TUC principles and appeared indicative of a 
prima facie case of partnership.  The main forum was the national level Joint 
Consultation and Negotiation Committee, chaired by the HR Director, and 
attended by the most senior union officials including the General Secretary 
who also acts as Chief Negotiator.  In practice, it was believed that most 
issues were advanced through more informal meetings and ‘corridor 
conversations’. Issues discussed typically included pay and working 
conditions, discipline and grievance, and organisational change. Much of the 
dialogue occurred at a national level, between senior management and 
senior union officials, while day-to-day issues were channelled through local 
employee involvement schemes which appeared to operate in parallel.  
 
Management and union respondents agreed the notion of partnership best 
described the style of management-union relations, although the term 
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‘partnership’ was not officially used.  As a mutual building society owned by 
members, BuSoc did not have the same commercial pressures to satisfy the 
stock exchange.  BuSoc have used their historical image as an ethically 
guided mutual institution to its advantage both in terms of consumer 
marketing, as well as their espoused approach to employment relations.  
Accordingly, compulsory redundancies at BuSoc were almost unknown, the 
business had committed not to offshore any functions abroad, and is well 
known in the sector for various pioneering schemes concerning work-life 
balance, domestic violence, home working, and equal opportunities.  Both 
the HR Director and Union President were keen to stress that most of their 
employment policies significantly exceeded the UK statutory minimum 
arrangements (equity).  
  
Yet some managers suggested that the general culture of organisation was 
‘perhaps too risk-averse’, at the expense of efficiency.  In employment 
relations terms, an example would be that the business would almost always 
settle tribunals claims out of court even if they believed they had a strong 
case, to avoid any potential damage to the ‘ethical’ brand image.  Similarly, 
it was suggested that the business seldom dismissed notoriously 
underperforming members of staff, and this related to what was described 
as a very ‘welfarist’ and ‘benevolent’’ culture.  This led to the perception by 
some managers that too much focus on ‘equity’ may actually be inefficient 
for the organisation.  As a Call Centre Manager explained: 
“If you want to get rid of someone who is no good, you need to get into a 
process with many steps, and a hearing between managers, the employee 
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and the union.  It can be very frustrating, you have someone who is sick 
every Monday, their results aren’t good.  They don’t give a damn about 
working here, let their team down, and there’s not much you can do about 
it”.  (Call Centre Manager). 
 
Though it was suggested that major conflicts between the union and 
management were relatively rare, the last major dispute concerned the end 
of the final salary pension scheme for new employees despite vehement 
union opposition.  In this case, the efficiency aim was clearly greater than 
the equity concerns.  Union officials opined that despite their opposition 
there was little they could do as the decision was ‘not unlawful’, and was 
simply presented to them as a fait accompli (minimal voice).  This occurred 
under the leadership of the previous Chief Executive who the Union General 
Secretary suggested was “strongly efficiency focused”, but suggested that 
the current Chief Executive appeared to be more interested in “his people as 
well profits”.  In this case, the attitudes of the personalities involved 
appeared to be central to the process, although the suggestion that major 
decisions such as pension arrangements can depend on the whim of the 
Chief Executive and the relationship he has with union officials, appears 
incompatible with the notion of a strong partnership. 
 
Some examples were cited where the union and management had  worked 
together but this was mostly on a minority of relatively uncontroversial 
issues.  For example they jointly devised a new performance management 
framework which they thought was fairer for employees (equity) but clearly 
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driven by a desire to improve employee and business performance 
(efficiency).  Moreover, the union was proud of its track record in negotiating 
pay deals which they believed were often the envy of many in the industry.   
 
Union officials stated that on balance BuSoc was a ‘good employer’, at least 
compared to competitors in the same sector, and this makes it difficult to 
assess the extent to which the union is actually making a difference, versus 
the extent to which this is a result of employer paternalism.  On the other 
hand, managers suggested that the staff union was an effective medium 
suggesting that since most officials are former employees, they could take a 
more ‘balanced view’ of situations:  
 “I’m always very impressed with the level of knowledge the union people 
have around what goes on in BuSoc, it makes it more transparent, and you 
know you can’t  pull the wool over each other’s eyes.  You both understand 
what you are dealing with” (Director of Personnel) 
“I’ve always seen the union as a bit of a regulator on us, making sure we do 
the right thing.  It doesn’t mean that they should stop the business making 
the right decisions for the business, because both parties have a vested 
interested in business success for customers and employees.  I think there 
have been several examples where the business has wanted to do 
something, and the union have come back and said, have you thought about 
X and Y.  And then we sit back and think, hmm, brainstorming is all very well 
but perhaps that wasn’t a particularly good idea after all” (Employee 
Relations Manager). 
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In general terms, the equity drivers were more prominent at BuSoc than in 
the other case organisations, and this may have meant there was less need 
for the union to adopt a proactive stance than at NatBank.  Moreover, within 
this context the grassroots interest in voice was lower.  Employees were 
apathetic and this appeared to stem from satisfaction as opposed to 
disillusionment.  Staff attitude surveys were normally very positive, and 
focus group discussions confirmed that most employees viewed BuSoc as a 
very good employer overall.  Where dissatisfaction did occur, this was 
attributed to problems of implementation of local decision-making and errant 
line managers, rather than dissatisfaction with corporate policy itself.     
 
Union representatives were often inactive, and many had been nominated 
by default.  Most of the negotiation and consultation occurred at a very 
senior level between Executives and one or two senior union officials.  
Perhaps this is partly the case because senior union officials are the few 
people not employed by the Society, and  it is possibly more difficult for 
seconded officials who are due to return to work after their union position 
ends to voice their true concerns.  Employees suggested that they would 
probably take more interest in employment relations matters had there been 
more controversial incidents as in other organisations.  Union officials also 
speculated that while the Executive Board are committed to mutuality for the 
foreseeable future, they wondered what impact de-mutualisation would 
have, and how the employment relations climate may change, and whether 
the need to deliver results to stock exchange could have a negative impact 
on the employment relations culture.     
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In sum, while the equity emphasis appeared to be much stronger than at 
NatBank, there was little evidence to confirm that this was because of a 
partnership relationship between the union and management, and highlights 
the significant possibility that BuSoc may still be a ‘good’ paternalistic 
employer irrespective of the union.    For example, there was still evidence 
to suggest that when external forces resulted in an efficiency ‘crisis’, such as 
the problems funding the final salary pension scheme, the efficiency force 
prevailed over equity with minimum voice afforded to employees or the 
union.     
 
WebBank: non-union partnership as ‘an alternative’ 
WebBank was set up in the 1990s with the aim of being ‘different’ and 
‘radical’ in the conservative UK banking market, offering competitive 
products aimed at young, educated and affluent consumers.  The company 
does not recognise a trade union, and in this context partnership concerned 
an in-house representative body affiliated to the Involvement and 
Participation Association known as the WebBank People Forum.  The 
Forum was the primary component of the WebBank partnership structure, 
and evolved from a team of three part time employee representatives, to 
three full-time and twelve part-time representatives.  The Employee Chair 
was involved in an array of meetings including a monthly meeting with the 
Chief Executive and Director of Customer Service. Any employee with more 
than six months services is allowed to stand for election as a representative.  
To date, the scope has mainly been around issues of organisational change 
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and discipline and grievance, although there was increasing evidence of 
some involvement around issues of pay and reward. 
 
Management suggested that since the company was listed on the stock 
exchange two years after launch, the pressure to deliver to shareholders 
has had a significant impact on day-to-day operations (efficiency).  Despite a 
high degree of UK success, WebBank was a loss-making business due to a 
combination of high start up costs and the failure of an overseas expansion 
project, breaking into profit for the first time in 2005.  In terms of voice, 
WebBank decided to set up an internal Employee Forum in preference to 
recognising an external trade union.  It was suggested that management 
perceived unions to be “too adversarial” and “at odds with the culture of a 
new organisation”.  Only five years old, the non-union Forum was still 
evolving but appeared to be run very much on terms set by management, 
and representatives and management were both clear of the fact that it is 
not a negotiating body.   Most of the representatives did not seem to have a 
problem with this role, although one did express some doubts regarding the 
ability of the Forum to challenge in the face of severe adversity. 
 
However, the existence or role of the Forum was not a priority for most 
employees, and many had limited knowledge or interest in the Forum.  At 
most, it was considered to be a ‘counselling service’, offering advice in the 
event of discipline and grievance cases.  However, as was the case with 
NatBank, there was some evidence of the Forum providing a useful voice 
channel, and acting to some extent as an efficiency-equity arbiter.  For 
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example, the Forum had challenged the selection procedures being used to 
decide new posts following an IT restructure which they believed were 
arbitrary and political.  It was believed that the final selection process was 
much fairer as a result (equity).  Moreover, there was a feeling that 
managers can devise pure process models in their search for efficiency, and 
that this is where it was suggested the dialogue added value (voice and 
equity). As a representative explained: 
“With restructures sometimes managers have a nice clockwork process 
flow, and just assume the people will be OK.  But they forget the human 
side, and even HR can forget that.  HR needs to check that things are 
legally watertight.  But they can get wrapped up in that, and forget the 
human side.  That’s where we come in” (Employee Representative). 
 
The Forum was also active in ensuring that disciplinary and grievance 
procedures were followed in a fair way and that due process was followed 
(equity).  A team manager recounted an incident involving a top performing 
employee who suddenly developed a poor attendance record.  It was 
suggested  that after several warnings an efficiency-oriented decision would 
need to be made to dismiss the employee.  The team manager admitted that 
he was slightly bewildered and disappointed by this, as the employee 
concerned was a consistently high performing member of staff, and 
therefore decided to ask a Web Bank employee representative to help.  It 
transpired that the employee had a poor relationship with her line manager, 
and believed that she had been the victim of bullying.  After investigation, 
the team manager transferred the employee to another team, and the 
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employee’s attendance record improved significantly.  The team manager 
believed that had there been no opportunity for forum intervention a high 
performing employee would probably have been dismissed, as without the 
voice process the root of the problem may never have been identified.  In 
other words, management may have dismissed the employee following 
several warnings, on the grounds that it was the most efficient decision.  
However, it was believed it was better to invest some time to ascertain the 
underlying cause and to try and resolve the situation.  This resulted in a 
decision which was both efficient for the organisation as a high performing 
employee was retained, but  it was also more equitable for the worker, as 
she was able to air her grievance and did not lose her job as a result of a 
relationship breakdown.  Indeed, the ostensibly efficient decision may 
actually have been inefficient given that an experienced and popular 
employee may have been dismissed. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the forum, the culture was said to be much 
more ‘hire and fire’, but it was believed the current dialogue (voice) 
facilitated better efficiency and equity outcomes:   
“We try to take a balanced attitude...we know what challenges you are up 
against Mr Manager, but we think this guy could be treated better than he 
has been” (Employee Representative). 
“Most employees at a disciplinary are blind to the problem at hand, or they 
don’t see why it’s such a problem.  So for them it’s not fair.  The forum is 
interesting because they’ve got both parties interests at hand.  They are 
there for me as well (Team Manager – Call Centre).  
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“We just want to make sure due process has been followed.  You can’t go 
from Step 1 to Step 5 in one move, you just can’t do that.  Legality is the 
start of how we should work, not the end of how should work” (Employee 
Representative). 
 
Overall though, WebBank management appeared much more interested in 
promoting efficiency rather than equity, and it was very much involvement 
on terms strictly defined and controlled by management. Even where 
decisions were ostensibly made in relation to equity, this was often 
underpinned by sound business rationale, although again this reinforces the 
notion that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive.   As an employee 
representative explained, they were expected to bring solutions to the table 
in respect of issues they raise, and not to solely highlight problems: 
“We can’t say no, you can’t do that, and leave it at that.  If we say no, they’ll 
say, why not?  Managers don’t want to hear no.  But we’ve got the ability to 
do research, and to develop ideas, solutions and workarounds” (Employee 
Representative). 
Nevertheless managerial respondents still acknowledged the value to the 
business of the structure (efficiency and voice): 
“Because the representatives are at the front line, we don’t go down the line 
of designing something wholly inappropriate.  We get valuable input from the 
people with a different perspective, which stops us wasting money and 
doing things that won’t work anyway.  They’ve got a different perspective to 
ours so it adds value” (Senior Technology Manager). 
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“We consult the representatives, but we aren’t necessarily reaching an 
agreement with them, but there would be no point consulting them if what 
they said didn’t influence us.  We want to be doing things that they support, 
and it frustrates me that sometimes the representatives are not involved as I 
believe we get a better result when they are” (HR Director).  
 
Representatives were also generally positive about the relationship they had 
with managers and the effectiveness of the process: 
“We have a very good relationship with senior managers.  We have access 
directly to the top.  The Chief Executive says hello to you.  We put a big 
emphasis on building relationships because we felt at an early stage that 
having a good relationship would be better than a lets-play-poker approach” 
(Employee Representative).   
“All we can do is make sure we get fair decisions.  We are there to make 
sure people get a fair deal.  I think we actually get to know more than a 
union would be told.  It is recognised by the top management, they value the 
input, and we are given the time and resources we need for the good of the 
people” (Employee Representative). 
DISCUSSION 
 
By employing the analytical framework proposed by Budd (2004) and using 
Critical Incident Technique (CIT), there was evidence to suggest that as a 
result of the voice and dialogue afforded through partnership, union/ 
employee representatives were often able to moderate decisions to mitigate 
the worst effects for employees at NatBank and WebBank.  At NatBank for 
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example, the union and management team worked together to reach an 
agreement regarding what would constitute a ‘fair’ redundancy policy.  This 
includes firstly discussing alternatives to job losses such as 
redeployment/relocation, minimising the number of losses, generous 
voluntary payments, career counselling and the provision of an extensive 
notice period.  Prior to partnership the approach was described as “much 
more cloak and dagger”.    The research revealed that moderation and 
mitigation by both management and employee representatives appeared to 
be an important characteristic of decision-making under partnership.   While 
the ideal decision for the union may have been no job losses, partnership 
enabled a compromise to be struck. 
 
The framework can also be used to illustrate the dynamics of discipline and 
grievance at WebBank.  High turnover and discipline cases were highlighted 
by senior managers at WebBank to be a significant problem especially in the 
call centre environment.  A key area of involvement for the Forum was 
acting as an intermediary in disputes between employees and line 
managers, and it was believed that the forum representative provided a 
useful additional perspective when disputes and grievances occurred.  
 
The same regulatory effect could not be readily identified in the case of 
BuSoc.  It was suggested that in the previous five years employment 
relations had generally been good, with few major controversies.  The main 
recent incident was identified as the end of the final salary pension scheme 
to new entrants.  This has become a significant issue among mutual 
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organisations as well as public limited companies, as spiralling pensions 
costs are seen to be eating into their ability to compete with their banking 
rivals.  Increasing subsidies for the funds is controversial as often the main 
beneficiaries are executives.  In 2001, the society took the decision to close 
the fund to new employees.  A more drastic but efficient decision may have 
been to close the scheme to all staff, although to date few employers in the 
sector have taken such steps.  A more equitable but less efficient approach 
may have been for the employer to increase their contributions and lump 
sum payments to help maintain the fund.  Importantly,  there was little 
evidence of the decision being regulated by the union, and the decision was 
said to have been imposed without consultation.  So while the decision may 
have been to end the final salary scheme to new members only, which was 
the course of action taken by other banks and building societies at a similar 
time, and not perhaps the more drastic closure of the scheme, there was 
little evidence of this being a result of union involvement.   In common with 
many other organisations, the future of the pension fund remains uncertain 
and is still a significant concern for the union. 
 
In other words, two of the cases demonstrated evidence of ‘partial success’ 
as in many instances the voice and consultation process appearing to 
‘moderate’ decisions in terms of ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’.  The same could 
not be said in the case of BuSoc, with the most important decision in recent 
years being made without consultation, and limited evidence to suggest that 
more positive decisions were actually the direct result of union engagement.  
Thus despite a common commitment to the notion of partnership, the 
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practice of partnership varied between cases.  At NatBank the degree of 
involvement was high and covered a wide scope of operational and strategic 
issues, and there was an emphasis upon local decision making.  At 
WebBank the degree of influence was lower, with the structure focused 
mainly on operational issues, but the forum remit has been widening over 
time.   
 
 BuSoc was the most problematic case of partnership.  The structure was 
highly centralised around a few key senior players, and the scope was 
focused around high level HR issues and dealing with local discipline and 
grievance cases.  While consultation processes at NatBank and WebBank 
resonated with many aspects of a more integrative problem-solving style, at 
BuSoc the core of union activity still revolved around distributive issues, with 
information and consultation often occurring between a few key actors.    
Nevertheless, the quality of employment relations at BuSoc was judged by 
management, union and employee actors as being good, underlining the 
complex relationship between process and outcomes. 
 
The Budd framework is therefore useful in illustrating how – and whether – 
partnership balances efficiency, equity and voice.  This study, however, 
prefers the use of the terms ‘accommodation’ or ‘moderation’. It is believed 
that these are the most compatible with the pluralist view of the employment 
relationship, without implying that there ought to be an equal weighting 
which new pluralism cannot offer, and arguably old pluralism never offered 
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either.  In short, partnership is perhaps better viewed as an attempt to make 
the employment relationship ‘less imbalanced’, rather than ‘balanced’. 
 
Clearly, the framework cannot necessarily help us identify complex issues of 
cause and effect.  It remains probable that businesses may achieve positive 
business/labour outcomes without partnership, and even a strong 
partnership need not automatically lead to guaranteed positive outcomes.  
This reflects the long standing complexity identified in the wider employee 
involvement and HRM literatures (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).    
Despite this important caveat, the Budd framework remains a useful 
heuristic device when exploring the more subtle processes, and the 
qualitative and quantitative outcomes of partnership from within the pluralist 
tradition.   Importantly, it encourages researchers to  engage in a more 
holistic assessment of outcomes beyond narrow institutional union interests 
or raw labour or business outcomes, as well as underlining the need to 
consider processes. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, there is a need to re-think exactly what partnership means and 
exactly what it is expected to achieve and assess accordingly.  The paper 
has also demonstrated the value of exploring decision making processes 
under partnership arrangements, as well the outcomes.  It is proposed that 
the concepts of efficiency, equity and voice suggested by Budd (2004) 
provide a very useful intellectual framework for doing this.  There is also a 
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need to compare the actual outcomes in real contexts of decision making 
shaped by partnership, and to compare outcomes not just with the ‘ideal’ 
outcome, but with the other possible alternatives.  The partnership debate 
could also benefit from a more rounded assessment of outcomes: 
partnership is not just about outcomes for the labour movement but also 
employees and society more generally.  The cost to the public recent 
developments in the global financial sector illustrates how efficiency matters 
to a wide range of stakeholders. 
 
As these cases demonstrate, several decisions were better than they could 
otherwise have been for staff, and the dialogue afforded through the 
partnership approach had resulted in several compromises to the benefit of 
employees by mitigating the impact of decisions (equity). There was 
evidence to suggest that without the voice afforded through the early 
consultation and mutual legitimacy afforded by partnership dialogue, 
management decisions may have been more focused on short-term 
efficiency, with scant regard for the equity outcomes.  Interestingly 
management acknowledged that decisions based solely on ‘profit-
maximising’ and ‘efficiency’ are often inefficient in the long-term because 
they are met with staff resistance and union opposition, whereas 
compromises which may appear to be less efficient  in the short-term, are 
actually more efficient in the long-term because of the greater legitimacy and 
acceptability.  In other words, managers at NatBank and WebBank 
acknowledged that often there was a sound business case for equity and 
that the concepts are not mutually exclusive.  Partnership may be unable to 
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neatly ‘balance’ the objectives of the employment relationship.  However, 
the process often led to outcomes which were more balanced than they 
otherwise would have been, and this is a central component of the pluralist 
ethic, where the aim is one of levelling the playing field (Clegg, 1975). 
 
Thus a strong, genuine partnership may encourage management to think 
more strategically and long-term in relation to their business strategies, and 
related HRM and employment policies.  To varying extents, partnership 
facilitated dialogue and voice, which promoted more considered decision 
making, the moderation of business decisions, and the moderation of the 
worst effects for employees.  When evaluated in this light, the cases of 
NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank demonstrate various degrees of success, 
although of course significant challenges remain if partnership is to become 
an enduring model of employment relations regulation in the UK.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voice 
 
Figure 1 – Efficiency, equity and 
voice 
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Table 1: Formal definitions of partnership 
Partnership element NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Joint commitment to 
organisational success (IPA) 
Commitment to the success 
of the enterprise (IPA) 
 
Securing and 
promoting 
long term 
success 
 
Efficiency 
and 
prosperity 
 
Joint 
commitment to 
success 
 
Mutual recognition of the 
legitimate role and interests 
of all parties (IPA) 
Recognising legitimate 
interests (TUC) 
 
Legitimate 
interests of 
all 
stakeholders 
 
Role of 
union and 
union 
membership 
 
Legitimate 
roles and 
responsibilities 
Commitment and effort to 
sustain trust (IPA) 
 
Mutual trust 
* 
 
 
Trust 
Means for sharing 
information (IPA) 
Transparency (TUC) 
 
Openness 
 
Information 
exchange 
 
Transparency 
Consultation, joint problem-
solving, employee 
involvement (IPA) 
 
Problem-
solving 
 
Consultation 
 
Consultation 
Policies to balance flexibility 
with employment security 
(IPA) 
Commitment to employment 
security (TUC) 
 
Employability 
Flexibility 
 
Business 
flexibility 
Employee 
protection 
 
Flexibility 
Internal 
movement 
Focus on quality of working 
life 
 
Equality 
Diversity 
Fair 
treatment 
 
Fair 
treatment 
Equality and 
diversity 
Training and 
development 
 
Equal 
opportunities 
Training and 
development 
Win-win (TUC)  
Promoting 
interests of 
all 
stakeholders 
 
Managing 
business in 
interests of 
company, 
employees 
and 
customers 
 
Act for good of 
bank and its 
people 
Sharing organisational 
success (IPA) 
 
Rewarding 
exceptional 
performance 
 
Prosperity 
for 
customers 
and 
employees 
 
Sharing 
success 
Adapted from IPA (1997), TUC (1999), internal company documentation 
 
 
 
Table 2: Three cases of partnership 
 NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Route to partnership Conflict Evolutionary Proactive 
Union 
External 
union 
Internal (staff) 
union 
Non-union 
Corporate 
governance 
PLC Mutual PLC 
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Structures and 
formality 
Formal Informal Informal 
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i Parallels can be drawn with the work of Walton and McKersie (1965), and in particular their 
concepts of integrative versus distributive bargaining, and related notion of ‘attitudinal structuring’. 
